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JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (k) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Whether the trial court erred in ruling that even if 
the indivisible injury rule was adopted in Utah, there was 
insufficient evidence to meet plaintiff's burden of proof that 
defendant Karen Stevenson proximately caused any of plaintiff's 
injuries. 
2. Whether the indivisible injury rule should be adopted 
in Utah. 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the reviewing 
court will liberally construe all the evidence and the inferences 
which may be reasonably drawn from the evidence in the light most 
favorable to the losing party and will affirm when there is no 
genuine issue of material fact. Malone v. Parker, 826 P. 2d 132, 
133 (Utah 1992) . 
2. As the issue of whether the indivisible injury rule 
should be adopted in Utah is a question of law, the lower court's 
determination is reviewed for correctness, Johnson v. Morton 
Thiokol. Inc., 818 P.2d 997, 1000 (Utah 1991), although, because of 
its ruling on issue number one above, the lower court never reached 
this issue. 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
Section 78-27-40, Utah Code Annotated (1993). (The statute 
is set out in full in Exhibit "A".) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1. Nature of the Case 
Plaintiff Jerry Stevenson- ("Plaintiff") initiated this 
lawsuit in the lower court seeking damages from defendant Karen 
Stevenson ("Defendant Stevenson") for personal injuries sustained 
in a multi-car accident ("accident").1 Plaintiff subsequently 
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, which was granted by the lower 
court. Plaintiff now seeks review of the lower court's award of 
summary judgment to Defendant Stevenson. 
2. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below 
Plaintiff filed suit against Defendants Stevenson and 
Kristy Armstrong seeking to recover damages for injuries sustained 
in a four-car collision.2 (R. at 1.) Defendant Stevenson denied 
liability and maintained that Plaintiff's injuries, if any, were 
proximately caused by the third driver involved [JoAnn Anderson], 
and not by Defendant Stevenson. (R. at 20.) Defendant Stevenson 
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on July 30, 1993. (R. at 59.) 
Plaintiff filed a Response to Defendant's Motion for Summary 
*Plaintiff has settled with JoAnn Anderson, one of the other 
drivers involved in the accident. 
2The claim against Defendant Kristy Armstrong was subsequently 
dismissed. 
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Judgment on August 26, 1993. (R. at 139.) On September 1, 1993, 
Defendant Stevenson filed her reply brief. (R. at 157.) On 
October 29, 1993, after oral argument, the District Court granted 
Defendant Stevenson's Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed 
Plaintiff's Complaint with prejudice and on the merits. (R. at 168 
and Exhibit "B".) The District Court found that, since Plaintiff's 
own expert could not testify as to a reasonable probability that 
the accident between Plaintiff and Defendant caused any injury to 
Plaintiff, the jury would be left to speculate on whether or not 
any of Plaintiff's injuries were caused by the impact between 
Plaintiff's vehicle and Defendant Stevenson's vehicle. Id. The 
court also found that, even if the indivisible injury rule was 
adopted in Utah, it would be inapplicable to the case at hand 
because Plaintiff's expert testified that the first impact between 
Plaintiff's car and the car driven by JoAnn Anderson was of 
sufficient speed and force to have caused all of Plaintiff's 
injuries and thus Plaintiff was unable to establish that Defendant 
Stevenson proximately caused any of Plaintiff's injuries sustained 
from the accident. Id. 
3. Reconciliation of the Statement of the Facts 
A four-vehicle collision occurred on December 8, 1986, on 
Riverdale Road (SR-26) in Riverdale, Utah. (R. at 63.) The 
accident occurred at approximately- 6:30 p.m. and, at the time of 
the accident, the road conditions were icy and it was snowing. (R. 
at 63.) JoAnn Anderson ("Anderson") was traveling east on SR-26. 
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(R. at 63.) Plaintiff was traveling west on SR-26. (R. at 63.) 
Defendant Stevenson was traveling west behind the Plaintiff. 
(R. at 63.) The fourth car was driven by Defendant Kristy 
Armstrong who was traveling east on SR-26. (R. at 63.) 
While traveling over a bridge, Anderson hit a patch of ice 
and lost control of her vehicle. (R. at 63.) Anderson's vehicle 
flew over the divider between the eastbound and westbound lanes, 
travelled into the westbound lane and collided head-on with 
Plaintiff's vehicle. (R. at 63.) The collision impact speed 
between the Anderson vehicle and Plaintiff's vehicle was estimated 
by Plaintiff's expert, Dr. Paul France, at approximately 50 m.p.h.; 
the collision was characterized as a severe impact. (R. at 64.) 
This first head-on impact caused the Plaintiff, who was not 
wearing a seatbelt, to be thrown violently forward, hitting the 
structures at the front of his car, including the windshield, dash, 
and the post between the windshield and the driver's door window. 
(R. at 64.) The initial head-on impact between Plaintiff and 
Anderson was sufficient to cause all of Plaintiff's injuries, which 
included facial damage, damage to the parietal skull region, blunt 
trauma to the chest, ribs and knees, and contusions to the knees. 
(R. at 64,) 
Defendant Stevenson had been traveling westbound, 
approximately 5-6 car lengths behind Plaintiff, at the time of the 
collision between Anderson and the Plaintiff. (R. at 64.) After 
observing the impact between Anderson and Plaintiff, Defendant 
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Stevenson attempted to avoid Plaintiff's car but was unable to stop 
because of the icy road conditions and lack of traction. (R. at 
65.) Therefore, subsequent to the severe head-on impact between 
Plaintiff and Anderson, Defendant Stevenson had a minor, rear-end 
impact with Plaintiff. (R. at 65.) Dr. France estimated the 
collision impact speed between Plaintiff and Defendant Stevenson at 
approximately 5-10 m.p.h., and characterized the collision as a 
minor impact. (R. at 65.) 
After the impact between Plaintiff and Defendant Stevenson, 
the fourth car driven by Defendant Armstrong lost control, came 
across the divider, and struck the Plaintiff. (R. at 65.) No 
collision impact speed was estimated for this third impact. 
(R. at 66.) 
On December 6, 1990, Plaintiff filed this suit against 
Defendant Stevenson and Defendant Armstrong. (R. at 1.) Plaintiff 
had previously settled with Anderson. (R. at 1.) Plaintiff 
retained Dr. France, a bio-mechanical/medical expert, to analyze 
the effects of the collision between Plaintiff and Defendant 
Stevenson. Dr. France was unable to attach any probability to the 
allegation that the Plaintiff was physically injured as a result of 
the second minor rear-end impact with Defendant Stevenson's 
vehicle, only a possibility. (R. at 66.) Dr. France also 
testified that the third impact between Plaintiff's car and the car 
driven by Defendant Armstrong did not cause Plaintiff additional 
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damage and Plaintiff dismissed his case against Defendant 
Armstrong, (R. at 53 and Exhibit MCM at p. 69.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
I. Even if the indivisible injury rule was adopted in 
Utah, Plaintiff still cannot sustain his burden of proving that 
Defendant Stevenson proximately caused any injury to Plaintiff. In 
a negligence action, a plaintiff has the burden of proving that the 
defendant's actions proximately caused the plaintiffs injuries. 
Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111, 116 (Utah 1991). A showing of 
proximate cause is required even when the indivisible injury rule 
is applied. Petersen v. Parry, 448 P.2d 653, 659 (Idaho 1968). 
Plaintiff's own expert witness concedes that there is not 
enough evidence to prove that Defendant Stevenson proximately 
caused or even aggravated any of Plaintiff's injuries. (R. at 66.) 
Therefore, Plaintiff has failed "to make a showing sufficient to 
establish the existence of an element essential to [Plaintiff's] 
case, and on which [Plaintiff] will bear the burden of proof at 
trial". Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). On 
that basis, summary judgment was appropriate and should be 
affirmed. 
II. The indivisible injury rule provides that two or more 
independent tortfeasors who have caused injury to a plaintiff are 
liable for all of the plaintiff's damages where it is not 
reasonably possible to make a division of the damage caused by the 
separate acts of negligence. Potts v. Litt, 828 P.2d 1239, 1241 
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joint and several liability on individual defendants. Holtz v. 
Holder, 418 P.2d 584, 588 (Ariz. 1966). This rule is in glaring 
contravention of § 78-27-40, Utah Code Ann., which abolishes joint 
and several liability in Utah. Therefore, the indivisible injury 
rule should not be adopted in Utah. 
ARGUMENT 
*• EVEN IF THE INDIVISIBLE INJURY RULE IS ADOPTED IN UTAH, 
PLAINTIFF CANNOT PROVE THAT DEFENDANT STEVENSON PROXIMATELY 
CAUSED ANY INJURY TO PLAINTIFF 
1. Plaintiff Cannot Prevail Under The Indivisible Injury 
Rule 
Even if the indivisible injury rule ("Rule") is adopted, 
Plaintiff still cannot prevail. The Rule provides that: 
two or more independent tortfeasors who have 
caused injuries to a plaintiff are liable for all 
the plaintiff's damages where it is not reasonably 
possible to make a division of the damage caused by 
the separate acts of negligence. 
Potts v. Litt. 828 P.2d 1239, 1241 (Ariz. App. 1991). 
The Rule was devised because "it is unfair to deny a 
[plaintiff] redress simply because he cannot prove how much damage 
each tort-feasor caused, when it is certain that between them they 
caused it all." Fugere v. Pierce, 490 P.2d 132, 135 (Wash. App. 
1971). (Emphasis added.) Joint and several liability is imposed 
by the Rule upon defendants when fault cannot be apportioned 
between "two or more independent tortfeasors who have caused 
injuries to a plaintiff." Potts v. Litt, 828 P.2d 1239, 1241 
(Ariz. App. 1991). (Emphasis added.) However, the Rule is 
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(Ariz. App. 1991), (Emphasis added.) However, the Rule is 
inapplicable when the evidence is insufficient to support a finding 
of proximate cause. Petersen v. Parry, 448 P.2d 653, 659 (Idaho 
1968). Therefore, defendants are jointly and severally liable for 
a plaintiff's injuries under the Rule only when the plaintiff is 
able to prove that each defendant proximately caused some injury to 
Plaintiff. As set forth below, the Plaintiff in this case has 
failed to establish that Defendant Stevenson proximately caused any 
injuries to this Plaintiff and, therefore, his claim fails under 
the Rule. 
2. Plaintiff Has Failed To Come Forth With Any Evidence 
To Prove Defendant Stevenson Proximately Caused Any 
Injury to Plaintiff 
Plaintiff has not and cannot come forth with any evidence 
to prove that Defendant Stevenson proximately caused any injury to 
Plaintiff. Dr. France, Plaintiffs own bio-mechanical/medical 
expert, explicitly testified that no evidence exists which would 
prove that Defendant Stevenson's conduct caused injury to 
Plaintiff: 
Q. So there's no medical evidence of a secondary 
impact [to Plaintiff] and you don't have enough 
evidence from the photographs or the evidence from 
the collision to tell me that in fact there was any 
kind of damage at all done [to Plaintiff] by the 
second impact. . . ? 
A. The only damage I know that I believe was 
created by this impact is what I see on the outside 
structure of the car... 
Q. And there's no physical evidence in the records 
or from the photographs that in fact the second 
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impact did any [physical] damage [to Plaintiff] at 
all, is there? 
A. Correct, 
(R. at 67-68.) Dr. France also testified to the fact that the 
initial, severe, head-on collision with Anderson was sufficient to 
cause all of Plaintiff's injuries. (R. at 64.) 
Furthermore, Dr. France testified only as to 
"possibilities" and refused to attach any probability on the issue 
of causation: 
Q. And we also know you don't know where Jerry's 
body is, Jerry's placement is after the first 
impact? 
A. Not specifically, no. 
Q. We know it's somewhere --
A. He's in the vehicle and I think he's in the 
front section somewhere. 
Q. In the front section of the vehicle somewhere? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How can you then form any kind of opinion on 
what happens to Mr. Stevenson's body by virtue of 
this second impact? 
A. I think I can indicate that there is a 
possibility for some aggravation or some further 
injury to the head, but I can#t place a probability 
on it. 
Q. -- almost anything is possible. It's possible 
I can hit an elephant when I leave the parking lot, 
but not likely. 
A. I hope not. 
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Q. I hope not either. But, you know, you're used 
to testifying as an expert in terms of reasonable 
medical probabilities, aren't you? 
A. Yes, I am. 
Q. That's how you prefer to testify is to give an 
opinion in terms of reasonable medical probability? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now, from the evidence that's before you in 
this case, are you able to give me any kind of 
opinion based upon a reasonable medical probability 
as to what, If any, damage was done to Mr. 
Stevenson by this second impact? 
A. I cannot establish the level of probability 
that this accident would have. I can say that it 
is greater than just the possibility we've just 
talked about, and that was hitting the elephant in 
the parking lot. 
Q. . . . But are you able to tell me in your 
opinion that there's a greater than 50-percent 
probability, for example? 
A. No. 
Q. Greater than 25-percent probability? 
A. I think the best I can do is to tell -- is to 
indicate that in relationship to the second 
accident there was some forces delivered to Mr. 
Stevenson's body. . . 
A. . . . Because I don't know his position at the 
end of the initial collision I cannot attribute a 
probability to what I say is possibly occurring. 
(Exhibit "C" at pp. 43-46.) (Emphasis added.) 
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From the above testimony, it is clear that Plaintiff failed 
to come forth with sufficient evidence to prove that Defendant 
Stevenson proximately caused any of Plaintiff's injuries. 
3. Summary Judgment Is Appropriate When The Plaintiff Is 
Unable To Establish Proximate Cause 
Plaintiff argues that summary judgment in Defendant 
Stevenson's favor was improper because a genuine issue of material 
fact existed regarding whether Defendant Stevenson caused any of 
Plaintiff's injuries. However, it is well established that summary 
judgment is proper if a party is unable "to make a showing 
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to 
that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden at 
trial." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986). At 
trial in a negligence action, a plaintiff has the burden of 
establishing that the defendant proximately caused the plaintiff's 
injuries. Reeves v. Gentile, 813 P.2d 111, 116 (Utah 1991). 
Although the issue of proximate cause is normally left for a jury, 
if the plaintiff is unable to prove that the defendant's negligence 
was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's injury, summary judgment 
is appropriate because a jury would be left to speculate on the 
issue of proximate cause. Mitchell v. Pearson, 697 P.2d 240, 245-
246 (Utah 1985) .3 As set forth above, Plaintiff was unable to 
3Plaintiff states that other jurisdictions have allowed 
indivisible injury rule cases to go to a jury even though the 
element of proximate cause is missing. Brief for Appellant at 
p. 7. Conspicuously absent from Plaintiff's argument is case law 
supporting this bald assertion. Contrary to Plaintiff's assertion, 
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establish that Defendant Stevenson proximately caused any of 
Plaintiff's injuries and, therefore, summary judgment in this case 
was appropriate and should be affirmed. 
B. BECAUSE JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY HAS BEEN ABOLISHED IN 
UTAH, THE RULE SHOULD NOT BE ADOPTED 
As set forth above, the underlying principle of the Rule is 
joint and several liability. However, in Utah, joint and several 
liability has been abolished. Section 78-27-40 of the Utah Code 
Annotated provides the following: 
[sjubject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum amount 
for which a defendant may be liable to any person 
seeking recovery is that percentage or proportion 
of fault attributed to that defendant. 
(Exhibit "A".) (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, a defendant cannot 
be held jointly and severally liable for an injury caused to a 
plaintiff by another independently negligent party. 
As is evident by the passage of § 78-27-40, the Utah 
legislature has deliberated the issue and has clearly rejected the 
concept of joint and several liability. The rule is unambiguous 
and provides for no exceptions: A defendant will be held liable 
solely for that percentage for which he or she is responsible. The 
plaintiff has the burden of proving that the defendant contributed 
to the injuries suffered by the plaintiff and to what degree. If 
a plaintiff is unable to meet this burden, then, according to Utah 
an indivisible injury rule case will not be submitted to the jury 
when the Plaintiff's evidence is insufficient to support a finding 
of proximate case. Petersen v. Parrv, 448 P.2d 653, 659 (Idaho 
1968) . 
-12-
law, that defendant cannot be held liable. Therefore, because the 
underlying principle behind the Rule is joint and several liability 
and because the Utah legislature has abolished joint and several 
liability without providing for any exceptions, the Rule cannot be 
applied in Utah. As a result, this court should refuse to adopt 
the Rule. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendant Karen Stevenson 
respectfully requests that this Court (1) affirm the lower court's 
ruling that even if the indivisible injury rule was applied, the 
Plaintiff is unable to sustain his burden of proving that Defendant 
Stevenson's conduct proximately caused any injury to Plaintiff, and 
(2) decline to adopt the indivisible injury rule as contrary to 
established Utah law. 
. / 
DATED this I^ day of April, 1994. 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Paul S. Felt 
Ju]/ia M. Houser 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Karen Stevenson 
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78-27-40. Amount of liability limited to pro-
portion of fault - No contribution. 
Subject to Section 78-27-38, the maximum amount for 
which a defendant may be liable to any person seeking 
recovery is that percentage or proportion of the 
damages equivalent to the percentage or proportion of 
fault attributed to that defendant, no defendant is 
entitled to contribution from any other person. 
1986 
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PAUL S. FELT (A1055) and 
JULIA M. HOUSER (A6250) of 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
Attorneys for Defendant 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385 
Telephone: (801) 532-1500 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
JERRY STEVENSON, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
KAREN STEVENSON and STATE FARM 
INSURANCE COMPANY, 
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 900903179PI 
Judge Michael J. Glasmann 
Defendant. 
ooOoo 
Defendant Karen Stevenson's Motion for Summary Judgment 
came on regularly for hearing on the 6th day of October, 1993 at 
the hour of 10:30 a.m. before the Honorable Michael J. Glasmann, 
District Judge, with James R. Hasenyager appearing for the 
plaintiff and Paul S. Felt appearing for defendant Karen 
Stevenson. The Court having read the memoranda on file, having 
reviewed the pleadings, having heard arguments and being fully 
apprised in the matter, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that 
defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment be and is hereby granted 
and plaintiff's Complaint is dismissed with prejudice and on the 
PvV»iK-if T5 
merits, the Court finding that since both parties stipulated the 
first accident between plaintiff and JoAnn Anderson was of 
sufficient impact that it could have caused all of plaintiff's 
injuries and since plaintiff's expert cannot testify that it is 
reasonably probable that the second accident caused any injury to 
the plaintiff, therefore, the jury would be left to speculate on 
whether or not any of plaintiff's injuries were caused by the 
impact between plaintiff's vehicle and defendant's vehicle. The 
Court rules that if the "indivisible injury" rule were to be 
adopted in the State of Utah, such rule would not apply to this 
case since plaintiff cannot establish that the impact between 
plaintiff's vehicle and defendant's vehicle was a proximate cause 
of any injury to the plaintiff. 
Defendant is awarded her costs of court in this action. 
DATED this — ^  day of October, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
APPROVED AS TO FORty: 
'<~*UCsf Yftfc^ 
James R. Hasenyager 
/Attorney for Plaintiff ' 
/ 
/ 
Honorable Michael J. Glasmann 
District Court: Judge 
47860 01/psf 
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J( 
I Examination by Mr. Peterson 
I 69 
1 J A, I based that on the ending positions of 
2 J the vehicles. In order for the cars to have ended 
3 1 up as diagramed in the accident report, that's where 
4 J that vehicle would have been coming from. 
5 1 Q. To reiterate a question Mr. Felt was 
6 I asking you, is there any evidence in the 
7 I documentation that you've reviewed and that we've 
8 I discussed in the deposition today to indicate that 
9 I the collision between the Loucel vehicle and Mr. 
10 I Stevenson's vehicle affected Mr. Stevenson in any 
11 way? 
12 A. Of the information that I have, that 
13 I I've reviewed and observed, I don't see that that 
14 I collision would have created a significant force. 
15 I Q. When you say significant force, what do 
16 I you mean by that? 
17 A. From an injury viewpoint. 
18 I Q. Does that mean that based on the 
19 J documents you've reviewed, the collision which we've 
20 I called collision no. 3 had no adverse impact on Mr. 
21 J Stevenson whatsoever? 
22 J A. As I now understand that collision, that 
23 J is correct. 
24 Q# Just a couple of tail ends. Other than 
25 I the computer-generated documents that we've reviewed 
ROBIN DUNN -- ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICES 
Exhibit C 
I Examination by Mr. Felt 
43 
1 Q. So that looks to you from the damage in 
2 J the photograph the appropriate angle of impact 
3 I between Karen Stevenson's car and Jerry Stevenson's 
4 car? 
5 I A. Yes. 
6 J Q. Now, I'm a little curious as to the fact 
7 I that we've now had this first major impact with the 
8 I Olds Toronado, we've had all the impact and the 
9 I damage that you've described in that crash with the 
10 J head accelerating forward and hitting the post and 
11 I now that collision -- the cars have come to rest for 
12 J whether it's a second or less than a second or more 
13 I than a second, I guess you don't know. 
14 1 A. Correct. 
15 J Q. And we also know you don't know where 
16 I Jerry's body is, Jerry's placement is after the 
17 J first impact? 
18 I A. Not specifically, no. 
19 I Q. We know it's somewhere --
20 J A. He's in the vehicle and I think he's in 
21 the front section somewhere. 
22 J Q. In the front section of the vehicle 
23 somewhere? 
24 A. Yes. 
25 I Q. How can you then form any kind of 
ROBIN DUNN -- ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICES 
Exhibit C 
Examination by Mr. Felt 
opinion on what happens to Mr. Stevenson's body by 
virtue of this second impact? 
A. I think I can indicate that there is a 
possibility for some aggravation or some further 
injury to the head, but I can't place a probability 
on it . 
Q. Well --
A. The possibility 
Q. -- almost anything is possible. It's 
possible I can hit an elephant when I leave the 
parking lot, but not likely. 
A. I hope not. 
Q. I hope not either. But, you know, 
you're used to testifying as an expert in terms of 
reasonable medical probabilities, aren't you? 
A. Yes, l a m . 
Q. Isn't that the way the question is most 
often framed to you? 
A. Usually that is the evidence that's 
brought before the jury is what's reasonable from a 
probability viewpoint. 
Q. That's how you prefer to testify is to 
give an opinion in terms of reasonable medical 
probabi1ity? 
A. Yes . 
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1 I Q. And in fact in the cases you t e s t i f y 
2 J about you are qualified by the attorney and a 
3 J foundation is laid and then the evidence is put 
4 I before you sufficient enough for you to give an 
5 I opinion in terms of reasonable medical probability 
6 I that a particular accident caused particular kinds 
7 I of d a m a g e to the p l a i n t i f f ? 
8 I A. Correct . 
9 I Q. Th a t ' s e s s e n t i a l l y what you d o , c o r r e c t ? 
10 J A. Y e s . 
11 I Q. Now, from the evidence that's before you 
12 I in this case, are you able to give me any kind of 
13 J o p i n i o n based upon a r e a s o n a b l e m e d i c a l p r o b a b i l i t y 
14 I as to what, if any, damage was done to Mr. Stevenson 
15 I by this second impact? 
16 I A . I ca n n o t e s t a b l i s h the level of 
17 p r o b a b i l i t y that this a c c i d e n t w o u l d h a v e . I can 
18 J say that it is greater than just the possibility 
19 J w e ' v e just talked a b o u t , and that w a s h i t t i n g the 
20 I elephant in the parking lot. 
21 I Q. Which is maybe less than one-tenth of 
22 I one percent, since there are no circuses in town. 
23 J But are you able to tell me in your opinion that 
24 there's a greater than 50-percent probability, for 
2 5 I example ? 
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1 A. No. 
2 I Q. Greater than 25-percent probability? 
3 1 A. I think the best I can do is to tell --
4 I is to indicate that in relationship to the second 
5 I accident there was some forces delivered to Mr. 
6 I Stevenson's body. Mr. Stevenson, I shouldn't refer 
7 I to him as a body, that's a little morbid. 
8 Q. We keep talking about his body, but we 
9 J all know that he did survive, luckily, the 
10 I accident . 
11 I A. Yes. And those forces have the ability 
12 J to cause enough acceleration to move him towards 
13 I another structure for impact. Because I don't know 
14 I his position at the end of the initial collision I 
15 J cannot attribute a probability to what I say is 
16 J possibly occurring. I think I stated that the way I 
17 wanted to. 
18 J Q. Well, are you able to give an opinion in 
19 I any kind of reasonable medical probability that the 
20 J second impact had any particular effect on Mr. 
21 J Stevenson's body? 
22 J A . I think that if the acceleration is 
23 J delivered to the car, and because of this five- to 
24 ten-mile-an-hour collision we're going to see 
25 J probably around one and a half to two Gs of 
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